SAML assertion errors after IdP certificate update

We recently completed a scheduled certificate rotation on our Okta tenant per our security policy (certificate valid from 2025-08-15 to 2026-08-15). Following the rotation, a subset of users—approximately 12 of 340—are experiencing authentication failures when attempting to access FieldPulse via SSO.

Error Manifestation

The affected users receive a generic "Authentication failed" message at the FieldPulse login screen after successful authentication at the IdP. I have confirmed that:

  1. The IdP-initiated flow completes successfully on the Okta side (SAML assertion generated, no policy violations)
  2. The SP-initiated flow exhibits identical failure patterns
  3. The discrepancy is not correlated with user role, department, or last login timestamp
  4. Metadata refresh has been performed on both systems

IdP Configuration Details

  • Identity Provider: Okta Workforce Identity Cloud
  • SAML Version: 2.0
  • Binding: HTTP-POST
  • NameID Format: EmailAddress (urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:nameid-format:emailAddress)
  • Signature Algorithm: RSA_SHA256
  • Certificate Chain: Single certificate, no intermediates

From a governance perspective, I am particularly concerned that the failure is selective rather than universal. This suggests a potential mismatch in attribute mapping or certificate validation logic that is not immediately apparent in the standard integration documentation.

It is worth noting that our previous certificate rotation (August 2024) proceeded without incident using identical procedures.

I have captured SAML assertion samples from both successful and failed authentications. The differences appear minimal, though I observe that the failed assertions contain an additional saml:AuthnContextClassRef node that was not present in our prior configuration. I am uncertain whether FieldPulse's SAML implementation enforces strict schema validation that might reject assertions with this element.

Requesting guidance on:

  1. Whether FieldPulse maintains certificate pinning that would require explicit update on the service provider side
  2. Any known issues with AuthnContextClassRef handling in the current SAML implementation
  3. Recommended debugging steps to capture SP-side validation errors (currently obscured by generic error messaging)

Ticket reference: FP-SAML-20250902-001

Parents
  • Eli, thank you for the comprehensive response. We have implemented Option A as an interim measure.

    Resolution Confirmation

    I configured a dedicated sign-on policy rule for the FieldPulse application within Okta:

    • Rule Name: FieldPulse_SAML_Compatibility
    • Condition: Application is FieldPulse
    • Action: Skip step-up authentication

    Following policy deployment, I validated authentication flows for 5 previously affected users. All assertions now generate without the AuthnContextDeclRef element, and SP validation completes successfully.

    From a governance perspective, I have documented this as a temporary compatibility measure with a scheduled review date coinciding with FieldPulse 3.4 release. I have submitted account ID FP-ACCT-8847 via support ticket for the permanent fix tracking.

    It is worth noting that this approach maintains our security posture—the step-up authentication remains enforced for all other applications, and FieldPulse access retains MFA via the primary Okta sign-on policy. The risk delta is acceptable for the interim period.

    I will monitor ENG-4421 for resolution confirmation. Thank you to Carlos and Eli for the collaborative diagnosis.

Reply
  • Eli, thank you for the comprehensive response. We have implemented Option A as an interim measure.

    Resolution Confirmation

    I configured a dedicated sign-on policy rule for the FieldPulse application within Okta:

    • Rule Name: FieldPulse_SAML_Compatibility
    • Condition: Application is FieldPulse
    • Action: Skip step-up authentication

    Following policy deployment, I validated authentication flows for 5 previously affected users. All assertions now generate without the AuthnContextDeclRef element, and SP validation completes successfully.

    From a governance perspective, I have documented this as a temporary compatibility measure with a scheduled review date coinciding with FieldPulse 3.4 release. I have submitted account ID FP-ACCT-8847 via support ticket for the permanent fix tracking.

    It is worth noting that this approach maintains our security posture—the step-up authentication remains enforced for all other applications, and FieldPulse access retains MFA via the primary Okta sign-on policy. The risk delta is acceptable for the interim period.

    I will monitor ENG-4421 for resolution confirmation. Thank you to Carlos and Eli for the collaborative diagnosis.

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